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Introduction 
 
15 November 2002: In the early morning hours a small fishing vessel from Mazara 
del Vallo in Sicily trawls the waters some 35 nautical miles south of the island of 
Pantelleria in search of its catch. Suddenly the crew of the Giotto spot another vessel. 
The 12m boat has engine damage and is drifting helpless in the choppy sea. Aboard 
are 129 migrants or, as the media will later refer to them, clandestini, illegal 
immigrants. The captain of the Giotto, Gaspare Giaccalone, informs the coast guard in 
Pantelleria. The local commander dispatches two patrol boats. The two officers, 
Francesco Nicolosi and Toni Casano, reach the ship abandoned by its crew. The wind 
from the nearby deserts in North Africa that the locals call scirocco whips up the sea. 
The rescuers realise that it is too dangerous in these weather conditions to transfer the 
shipwrecked migrants onto the coast guard vessels. They decide to tug the vessel into 
port at Pantelleria together with the Giotto. 
The four ships arrive at destination at a quarter to seven in the evening. One can 
see that the people who leave the boat are not from nearby Morocco or Tunisia. Their 
skin colour gives away their origin from further South. Most turn out to be from 
Liberia. There are men, women, and children. The youngest, Milton, is barely over 
two years old. He is travelling with his mother, a housekeeper, and his father, a 
painter and decorator. The migrants are exhausted from the strenuous trip, scared, and 
cold; some suffer from hypothermia. A few are too weak to walk by themselves. One 
man faints, and is assisted by Doctor Nagar of the local hospital. The police 
accompany the migrants to buses that take them to a refugee centre next to a military 
barrack. The local authorities provide the migrants – most of whom have no money 
on them – with blankets, clothes, and food. 
The fate of these people in Europe is uncertain. But they were relatively lucky. 
Every year people who try to get illegally into Europe face horrible ends to their 
journeys: they drown in the Mediterranean; they freeze to death crossing the 
mountains in Romania or the woods that separate Russia from the Baltics; they 
suffocate in unventilated truck trailers; or they get killed by unscrupulous traffickers 
along the way. 
Why do people entrust their lives, and that of their children, to unsafe passages to 
distant destinations where they will officially not even be welcome? People try to 
come to Europe for many reasons. One almost all share is hope for a better life 
compared to what they are used to in their home countries. There are again many 
reasons that make life difficult at home. Many, perhaps most, are home-made. This 
essay first focuses on one that is not, namely rampant protectionism by a blatantly 
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hypocritical EU against the very products which poor countries are good at making. If 
you cannot sell what you produce, you can sit back and either despair or fantasize that 
divine intervention may rain milk and honey on you. Or you consider your options, 
get up and leave in search for something to do, including a job abroad, that allows you 
to take care of your family. In short, market access and migration are linked, albeit not 
always in intuitively obvious ways. Protectionism sheds light on the difference 
between the ideology and practice of globalization, or between what it promises and 
what it actually delivers.  
The second focus of the essay is on the causes, mechanisms, control, and 
consequences of migration itself. Most of the readers of this book are in principle 
likely to have the required identity papers and the financial resources to go to pretty 
much any place in the world, be it for work or for pleasure, if not immediately then at 
some not too distant point in the future. They have that in common with the increasing 
volume and variety of cross-border flows of goods, services, and capital that, along 
with rapid technological innovation, we tend to think of as globalization. But the 
freedom to travel is the privilege of a relatively small elite. The vast majority of the 
world’s population could not simply hop on a plane to Paris or London even if it 
could afford the ticket. The reason is that their request for a visa would be turned 
down. To them, globalization means putting up with more international competition at 
home while not being able legally to offer their labour abroad. If circumstances make 
them go anyway, they become illegal migrants and subject to legal and other 
sanctions. They are also likely to come in contact with one of the fastest growing and 
most heinous forms of organized crime, namely human trafficking. If they make it to 
a destination country, their illegal status affects how they work, where they stay, and 
if they can integrate into the local society, including the official labour market. 
The contradiction between the progressive liberalization of the markets for (most 
but not all) goods, services, and capital on the one hand, and the retention of severe 
restrictions on the mobility of labour on the other, is the third and final focus. The 
liberalization of the world economy makes it necessary for individuals, firms, and 
countries to adjust to often dramatic changes. The benefits and the costs of this 
process are not distributed evenly. By keeping labour mobility off the globalization 
agenda, rich countries deprive poorer countries of benefits. This is brutally selfish, 
curiously short-sighted, and totally inconsistent with growing economic 
interdependence in the world. 
 
Global trade liberalization and (EU) market access 
 
The EU is a major player in the world trading system. In 2001, 18.4 per cent of the 
world’s exports originated in the EU and it was the destination for 18.2 per cent of its 
imports. 29.2 per cent of developing country exports went to the EU in 2000, slightly 
more than to the US. The EU is also one of the most influential WTO members. 
Issues it pushes are likely to being paid attention to, even if controversial, and not 
much happens in world trade negotiations unless the EU is on board. The EU regards 
itself both as a champion of global trade liberalization and a staunch defender of 
developing-country interests. On 16 December 2002, Pascal Lamy, the European 
Commission’s chief trade official, declared after submitting the Commission’s ideas 
for agricultural negotiations in the current world trade round: 
 
The message today is we are pushing the Doha development agenda forward across the board. 
We are ready to put our money where our mouth is, and we have now put forward ambitious 
but realistic proposals in all sectors, including agriculture, one of the most challenging for the 
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EU. This is a win-win proposal. It is fair to others, particularly developing countries, as it 
takes into account their development needs. 
 
 To many farmers and producers of labour-intensive products like textiles or clothes 
in developing countries this must have seemed a bad, old joke. Bad, because EU trade 
policies are inimical to giving poor countries a fair chance to compete in the global 
economy. All rich countries are hypocrites when it comes to protectionism. The EU 
has merely the dubious honour of being primus inter pares of the bad guys. In a report 
entitled Rigged Rules and Double Standards, the British charity Oxfam crowned the 
EU the winner of the Double Standards League of free-trade rhetoric and protectionist 
practice, ahead of the US, Canada, and Japan.1 
 The joke is also old. Global trade negotiations take place, until 1994 under the 
auspices of the GATT and from 1995 through the World Trade Organization (WTO), 
in so-called “rounds”. EU intransigence on farm sector reform is proverbial and 
almost derailed the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations in the early 1990s. Ten years 
on, in the curiously named Development Round of world trade negotiations launched 
in Doha, Qatar, in November 2001, the EU is again holding up progress in 
agricultural liberalization, by and large the single most important potential outcome of 
global trade talks for the large majority of developing countries.  
 This section describes EU trade policy vis-à-vis developing countries in the context 
of commitments under the WTO Uruguay Round Agreement.2 It points out where the 
EU has not honoured the spirit of the Agreement and what consequences this has had 
for developing country producers. It also looks at the ongoing new world trade talks 
in which the EU is again showing little inclination to entertain demands for farm 
sector reform.  Finally, it discusses the reasons behind this sorry state of affairs. 
 
EU TRADE POLICY VIS-À-VIS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Agriculture 
 
Many of the world’s poorest people eke out a living by working the land. In the 49 
poorest countries, from Afghanistan to Zambia, three fourths of the labour force work 
in agriculture, producing 30 per cent of GDP.3 So one of the grand bargains 
underlying the Uruguay Round negotiations was to bring agriculture for the first time 
into the multilateral discipline of the WTO. In exchange the developing countries 
agreed to the inclusion of issues close to the heart of multinational firms, namely 
services (GATS), trade-related investment measures (TRIMS), and trade-related 
intellectual property rights (TRIPS). 
 The Agreement on Agriculture required the EU to replace non-tariff barriers such 
as quotas with more transparent tariffs and to reduce average tariff levels. Yet tariffs 
applied by rich countries on farm goods on average remained four to five times higher 
than those on industrial products (see Table 1); more than a third of EU agricultural 
tariff lines which denote the import taxes individual products face had duties above 15 
per cent.4 Products of particular export interest to developing countries, such as in 
food processing, regularly run into tariff peaks that, for example for meat products, 
can go as high as 250 per cent. The world’s other major traders are no angels, either – 
Canada protects its meat industry with tariffs of 120 per cent, while the US charges 
121 per cent on ground nuts and Japan 170 on raw cane sugar. Tariff escalation, a 
practice whereby products at higher levels of processing attract higher tariffs than the 
upstream inputs, essentially allowed rich countries to engage in import substitution of 
more profitable downstream activities. In plain language this means that a poor 
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Colombian coffee farmer can export coffee beans without facing tariffs. This is 
essentially because rich countries need the beans but cannot grow them. But tariffs 
would hit him hard were he to try and export roasted or soluble coffee. Rich countries 
prefer to keep the only lucrative part of the coffee value chain for their own 
producers. Under these circumstances it is pretty difficult to increase local value 
added which is what needs to happen for incomes in poor countries to grow. 
Ironically, if poor countries tried to do the same thing by raising tariffs on, say, 
machinery to build up their own equipment industry, the international financial 
institutions would harangue them for applying the wrong policy. Finally, developing-
country producers continued to attract the misguided wrath of EU bureaucrats who 
subjected them to anti-dumping investigations or countervailing action. In the former, 
the EU Commission accuses foreign producers of selling their wares in the EU market 
below cost to gain an unfair competitive advantage. In the latter, it charges that 
foreign firms benefit from government subsidies that give them an edge vis-à-vis their 
competitors in the EU. The economic logic behind these actions is dubious at best, 
and the administrative practice is ludicrous in its bias in favour of vested domestic 
interests – of producers, that is, because consumers would obviously only benefit 
from cheap imports. 
 
Table 1. – Uruguay Round tariff rates of OECD countries 
 
Sector Bound rate % Applied rate %
 
Agriculture 15 14
Textiles and clothing 11 8
Other manufactures 4 3
   
 
Source: Kym Anderson, “Developing-Country Interests in WTO-Induced Agricultural Trade Reform,” 
in Ramesh Adhikari and Prema-Chandra Athukorala, eds, Developing Countries in the World Trading 
System: The Uruguay Round and beyond  (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002), 40-67, Table 3.1. 
Note: Bound rates refer to the maximum applicable rates as opposed to those that are effectively 
applied. The higher bound rates may be invoked in times of distress. 
 
The Agreement also committed the EU to reducing domestic and export subsidies. 
But EU countries every year still subsidize the farm sector with more than  $300bn, 
roughly twice as much as the value of agricultural imports from developing 
countries.5 For good measure, most of these subsidies are concentrated on 
commodities exported to the South. In the current trade talks, the EU has agreed to 
negotiate reductions – not eliminations – of export subsidies, but not a cut in the 
overall level of subsidies. 
All of this is bad news for farmers in developing countries, except for those in some 
former colonies who enjoy privileged trading relationships with the EU. In short, EU 
farm trade policy has three effects. First, high average tariffs make it difficult or 
outright impossible to penetrate the EU market. Tariffs on meats, cereals, and dairy 
products range between over 50 and more than 100 per cent. Second, subsidies (both 
export and non) allow EU producers to dump their products at artificially deflated 
prices on developing-country markets. Hand-outs from the CAP amount to between 
one half (wheat) and three quarters (beef and veal) of the income of export producers. 
This allows EU exporters to offer their fare at between a quarter (white sugar) and one 
half (skimmed milk) of production costs and pushes more competitive local producers 
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out of the domestic market.6 Third, the glut of EU exports also reduces the 
contestability of (non-sugar producing) third markets both in high- and low-income 
countries simply because nobody can beat the subsidised prices of EU exporters. 
The cost of refined cane sugar from South Africa, Mozambique, Malawi, and 
Zambia is considerably less than one half of the cost of refined beet sugar from 
Europe. Yet in 2001 EU sugar exports accounted for 40 per cent of the world market. 
Both farmers and refiners such as Germany’s Südzucker, Italy’s Eridania, and the 
UK’s British Sugar enjoy guaranteed prices. The life of these companies resembles 
the best tradition of Soviet planning. The EU market is protected by tariffs up to 140 
per cent while these de facto monopolists overcharge European consumers who pay 
three times the world price for their sugar, and swamp third markets.7 Poor farmers in 
poor countries pay a high price for these instances of organized and officially 
approved market distortion – often they have no choice but to give up farming 
because they cannot cover their costs. 
 
Textiles and clothing 
 
Textiles and clothing are another important sector for developing countries. 
Traditionally the EU, along with the US, Canada, and Norway, had protected its 
textile and clothing markets through the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA). Under the 
MFA, industrial countries negotiated bilateral quotas with important textile producers 
such as China, Hong Kong, India, and Korea, as well with marginal exporters like the 
Fijis and Slovenia. These quotas set upper limits on exports from developing 
countries. In the Uruguay Round developing countries obtained a commitment, 
through the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), from advanced importing 
countries to start liberalizing the sector in 1995 and completely but gradually phase 
out quotas over a ten-year period. 
 What the EU has done during this transition period, in the good company of the US 
that has an even worse record in textile protectionism, is to follow the letter of the 
ATC while giving its spirit short shrift. Under the ATC each importing country is free 
to decide which products it wants to include in quota-free imports in the three 
liberalization stages – 1995, 1998, 2002 – provided for by the Agreement. Since the 
product coverage of the ATC is more extensive than that of the MFA, countries were 
in principle allowed to integrate products that were never affected by quotas in the 
first place. Like picking one’s nose in public, this was not strictly illegal but clearly 
neither constituted what is generally regarded as correct behaviour. It is exactly the 
course of action taken by the EU. Until the end of 2001, the EU had eliminated only 
14 of its 219 quotas, affecting a mere five per cent of total restrained imports, and 
concentrating on lower value added commodities such as yarns and fabrics. It plans to 
drop only a further 38 quotas in the third stage, thus leaving the bulk of liberalization 
of clothing – almost four fifths of all restrained products – for the very end of the 
transition period in 2004 (Brenton 2002, Kheir-El-Din 2002).8 Even then things are 
not going to be easy for textile exporters. Tariffs on clothing are two to three times as 
high as those on other industrial products (see Table 2). In addition, just to compound 
the bad news, the EU resorts to tariff escalation, much like in agriculture, and when 
imports surge despite all this armoury, imposes anti-dumping measures which pretty 
much amounts to penalising foreign producers for being more efficient than their EU 
counterparts. Unfortunately, while the Uruguay Round Antidumping Agreement 
clarified the procedures under which antidumping cases can be pursued – for 
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example, injury to the claimant industry must be shown for action to be taken – it did 
nothing to address the weird logic upon which antidumping investigations are based.9 
 
Table 2. – Import-weighted MFN average tariffs by product group, % 
 
 Manufactures Textiles Clothing
    
Developed countries 3.1 8.1 12.2
EU 3.5 8.2 11.7
US 3.0 8.1 12.0
    
 
Source: UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 2002 (Geneva: UN, 2002), Table 4.3. 
 
The implication of all this is that the more important the EU is as an export market 
and the more important textiles and clothing are in a developing country’s export 
composition, the worse the ATC’s effects – or, more precisely, the liberty the EU has 
taken in interpreting it – would appear to be. 
  
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRADE POLICYMAKING 
 
It is not surprising that uncompetitive businesses ask for import protection. But it is a 
little harder to understand why farm businesses or manufacturers of textiles and (non-
luxury) clothing, not exactly the powerhouses of advanced economies, are successful 
in obtaining protectionism. Economic theory teaches two things. The first is that 
liberalization creates winners and losers. The second is that, on balance, due to the 
efficiencies associated with letting people do what they do best, the gains to the 
winners outweigh the costs to the losers so that liberalization brings net benefits. 
Clearly, if global farm trade were radically liberalised, many European farmers would 
land on hard ground. But competitive farmers the world over would benefit, and so 
would European consumers, both because it would lower their taxes and because they 
would get a litre of milk for approximately half of what they pay under the current 
system. The IMF estimates that world farm liberalization would generate static 
benefits to the tune of $128bn of which the developing countries would roughly get a 
fifth. 
 So if the EU’s leaders decided on the basis of economic rationality, they would 
scrap the current system. Of course, politics is about more than just the most efficient 
possible resource allocation. For example, it is about a fellow called Stoiber trying to 
win a federal election in Germany in 2002, and another fellow called Chirac trying to 
avoid losing an election in France in 2002. Both of these men are beholden to farm 
interests even though agriculture accounts for little in terms of output and 
employment in either one of these countries. Farm interests have been so successful in 
lobbying EU governments because humouring them is politically easier than standing 
up to their blatant rent seeking. It would be different if every packet of butter carried a 
label advising the consumer that thanks to her purchase the owner of a large agro-
industrial complex with a financial net worth the multiple of her own was yet again a 
little richer. But trade and subsidy policies are rarely if ever that transparent. In most 
EU countries, the farm ministry is firmly in the hand of the farm lobby which is a bit 
like ministries of defence representing the armed forces rather than defending national 
security. 
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 The EU’s intransigence vis-à-vis developing-country interests in farm goods and 
labour-intensive commodities in the global trade talks suggests that it is trying to get 
away with reaping as many benefits as possible from globalization while having 
others foot the associated bill. Even where laudable attempts were made – for 
example with the 2001 Everything-but-Arms initiative aimed at allowing the world’s 
49 poorest countries tariff- and quota-free access to the EU – producer lobbies 
succeeded to obtain exemption for big-ticket items such as sugar, rice, and bananas.  
If this strategy of malign neglect of developing-country interests plays out – as it did 
for pretty much all advanced economies in the aftermath of the Uruguay Round – the 
EU is doing a marvellous job at furthering its unenlightened self-interest. 
 However, on current standing it does not look as though this strategy will play out 
at all. So there is hope that the EU, short of letting the Doha Round collapse, will 
eventually have to compromise. 
  
MARKET ACCESS AND MIGRATION 
 
The link between trade and migration is complex. For example, it is obviously not the 
case that all people who cannot make a living by selling their products become 
migrants. Some are simply too poor to have the option of trying their luck in a 
different place. Yet it is also clear that the impossibility of making a livelihood in one 
location contributes to the pressure to look for alternatives in another, regardless of 
whether this eventually translates into a move or remains an unrealised aspiration.10 
Although the link between trade liberalization and migration is not straightforward, 
it is pretty obvious that keeping competitive exports such as textiles and farm goods 
from poor countries out of rich-country markets, begets people packing their bags and 
leaving. It is also obvious that EU farm subsidies have the same effect.11 Trade 
integration per se is unlikely to change this insofar as income levels may continue to 
diverge across factors, sectors, or regions. This means that the dynamics and pressures 
associated with globalization would put immigration on the agenda even if 
protectionism were a foreign term in the world economy. Liberalizing labour flows 
would likely bring much higher benefits than what the world can hope for by way of 
gains from the current Doha trade negotiations. The next section shows why. 
 
Migration and immigration 
 
If the 1990s saw globalization make big strides, they were also the decade in which 
countries the world over adopted more restrictive immigration regimes than 
previously. In 1976, only some 7 per cent of UN members had restrictive policies in 
place. At the time of writing, their share had risen to 40 per cent in a substantially 
larger UN. Advanced economies are at the forefront of this development.  This throws 
up the question why people do not enjoy the freedoms accorded to goods, services, 
and capital. This section attempts to answer this question. It first gives an idea of the 
scale of migration worldwide. Next it discusses theoretical explanations of why 
people move and contrasts them with empirical findings. The following section again 
takes up linkages between trade and migration. Then it describes the economic and 
political rationales underlying immigration policy in the EU; its structure and content; 
and discusses the implication of the current regime. 
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SCALE AND SCOPE 
 
Migrants are people who live permanently or for long periods outside their countries 
of origin.12 Estimates differ as to how many people fit this definition worldwide. For 
anyone interested in a frank discussion of the relative merits of immigration, it is 
convenient to drop conservative estimates in favour of higher numbers. This is 
because in the controversy with those who conjure up images of mass invasions of 
receiving countries by the world’s poor, belittling the extent of the phenomenon is 
bound to fail. 
Worldwide some 150-200 million people are migrants with regular papers. It is 
obviously more difficult to be sure about the extent of irregular migration but 
observers attach a similar ballpark figure again to those like the new shipwrecked 
arrivals in Pantelleria. All told, fewer than 7 per cent of the world population are 
migrants.13 The 56 million regular migrants in Europe compare to 50 million in Asia, 
41 million in North America, and 16 million in Africa. Almost two thirds of these 
people are concentrated in just 15 both rich and poor countries.14  
Of course, the concentration of migrants varies widely across countries. In Europe, 
one out of three inhabitants of Luxembourg is a foreigner, and one out of five in 
Switzerland. The share of foreigners in Germany and Austria is relatively high at 9 
per cent; by contrast, it is rather low in Italy and Spain at below 2 per cent. But two 
thirds of foreigners in Europe are actually other Europeans, although intra-European 
migration represents less than 0.2 per cent of the EU population.15 In 1999, this meant 
that for every 1000 inhabitants 27 foreigners arrived in Luxembourg, and fewer than 2 
in France, Finland, Hungary, and Portugal.16 Some 223,000 seasonal workers were 
employed in Germany; France admitted about 8,000. In places like Brussels or 
London one in four inhabitants is foreign.17 Documented Africans and Asians 
numbered three and two million, respectively, in 1996.18 New arrivals of clandestini 
are estimated at 500,000 per year. To bring these figures into perspective, Iran and 
Pakistan alone host some three million Afghans.19 
 
Table 3. – Share of non-nationals in the EU-15, 1985-98 
 
0
1
2
3
4
Year
%
Other EU nationals
Non-EU nationals
 
Source: Eurostat, European Social Statistics. Migration (Luxembourg: Office of Publication of the 
European Communities, 2000), Table A-5.2. 
 
In discussions about whether these numbers mean that there are – by whatever 
standards – “too many” immigrants in Europe convenient use is made of an old myth, 
namely that Europe has traditionally not been an immigration target and, by 
implication, could or should not become one, either. In Guests and Aliens Saskia 
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Sassen picked the myth apart and set the historical record straight. Immigration has 
always existed, including to traditional out-migration countries like the EU’s southern 
members.20 It materialized because the supply of migrants was met by demand for 
labour and thus conditioned on the operation of the economic system in receiving 
countries. Historical evidence also shows that when opportunities are saturated, 
migrant flows eventually adjust downward, although this may take time and be 
incomplete. 
Thus, when mass outmigration from Greece in the 1960s led to seasonal or longer-
term labour shortages on fields, construction sites, and dockyards, Africans arrived to 
fill the vacancies with official blessing. Around the same time Tunisians settled in 
western Sicily to help in the fishing fleet, as grape harvesters, or on construction 
sites.21 And while the majority of these immigrants hailed from nearby African 
countries such as Egypt or Morocco, others came later from as far away as Sri Lanka, 
Cape Verde, or Peru.22 Apart from the obvious answer that migrants are somehow in 
search of a better life, the question remains what exactly causes people to migrate, 
who they are, where they go, and how long they stay. 
 
WHY DO PEOPLE MOVE? 
 
Very few people move because they think it’s fun. The vast majority of humans prefer 
to spend their lives close to where they were born. When people hit the road, it is 
mostly for negative reasons. Often life at home is hard or perhaps unsustainable. 
Wars, famines, or altogether failed states and the attendant consequences of poverty 
and economic stagnation are among the more extreme causes. 
Theories of migration differ in terms of what they consider the key unit of 
analysis.23 Standard neoclassical economics focuses on individuals; they decide to 
move if the expected net return from migration is positive over a certain period of 
time. This calculation depends mainly but not exclusively on economic considerations 
such as job opportunities. Individuals try to get a job abroad if the cost of making it to 
the foreign country is lower than the expected wage differential. In other words, once 
international wage differentials equal the costs of labour movement, the migration 
process stops. 
More recent work looks at related groups of people such as households or extended 
families. They insure themselves against unexpected income losses due to crop 
failures or commodity price declines by sending members abroad who provide them 
with remittances. The government of the Philippines sponsors this kind of migration. 
It looks after the welfare of Filipino migrants abroad, approved legislation to allow 
them to vote in 2004 elections, and annually honours outstanding migrants through 
Bagong Bayani (new heroes) awards.24 According to IMF estimates, worker 
remittances and employee compensation accruing to developing countries annually 
run to about $60-$70bn. Thus the official figure alone exceeds the approximate $50bn 
of development aid flows. Obviously, unofficial figures are much higher because 
migrants from countries with underdeveloped banking systems or untrustworthy 
institutions rely on money-transfer channels that do not show up in official statistics. 
When remittances are invested visibly, they may become symbols of migration 
success and set in motion cumulative causation by encouraging others to follow the 
good example. 
Migration, especially over large distances, is resource-intensive. It is clearly easier 
for people with means to afford these costs. But migration is also an option to the 
poor. They can sign a bond to repay the debt they owe a trafficker in exchange for 
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bringing them into a destination country.25 Increasingly, this is becoming a form of 
modern slavery. The issue of trafficking is taken up in more depth below. 
Globalization, too, contributes to migration. When backward areas are brought into 
the global economy, existing societal structures are often disrupted so that previous 
ways of living become unviable. For example, foreign direct investment (FDI) by 
multinational firms into modern agro-industrial complexes tends to displace small 
farmers who have little choice but to try and become wage labourers. Unless their 
home cities provide employment opportunities, they go to look for jobs abroad. 
Or take a western multinational electronics company that invests in an export-
processing zone in a developing country. It tends to hire young women who give up 
traditional unwaged employment in, for example, subsistence farming. Having 
abandoned their fields, they can rarely return to their previous activity, even if their 
jobs in the factory don’t work out. Household production for internal consumption or 
for the local market also ceases, making food security more precarious. The 
feminization of the workforce means that men all of a sudden face more competition 
from women. Also, when women along with the extensive support they provide are 
absent from traditional households, traditional employment opportunities for men fall. 
All of this may raise unemployment and contribute to a migration push, first into local 
cities, and then into cities abroad.26 
It takes two to tango, and migration flows also depend on pull factors in the 
recipient countries. Investment bankers in New York and London entrust their kids to 
nannies from Latin America and the Philippines.27 The vegetable harvests in Italy’s 
Apulia or Spain’s Andalusia wouldn’t happen without seasonal workers from 
Morocco. Small and medium-sized manufacturing firms in Central and North-Eastern 
Italy in industries as diverse as apparel and agricultural machinery have resorted to 
immigrant labour to cope with increasing competition from East Asian tiger 
economies since the 1970s.28 Sweatshops power both high-tech and downgraded 
manufacturing sectors. Leather accessories of the world’s most renowned fashion 
houses are assembled right under our noses by migrant workers cramped into damp 
and dark basements toiling away long hours for abysmally low pay. In Los Angeles’ 
garment district or Milan’s Chinese quarter enormous wealth and highly rewarded 
employment in professional services co-exist – or draw on in hinterland locations – 
with underground industries that operate in third-world conditions.29 The point is that 
unskilled jobs can be part of the most modern sector of the economy, and backward 
sectors can be part of major growth trends.30 This phenomenon is not exclusive to rich 
countries. With long-term growth rates in Eastern Europe likely to be higher than in 
Western Europe, countries like Poland are likely to experience the same tight labour 
markets as some sectors in its neighbouring countries.31 
The black economy in the EU is estimated at 16 per cent.32 Many of these are the 
so-called 3D jobs (dirty, difficult, and dangerous) that resident workers refuse to 
accept. Migrant workers fill these jobs because they are willing to, and because their 
unofficial status makes them attractive to employers. If they become specialists in 
certain occupations, demand for them will rise as economic opportunities expand. So 
economic misery in one part of the world is not a sufficient condition for migration; it 
works only in conjunction with organized recruitment in the other. Empirical evidence 
shows that when demand falls, both legal and illegal migration flows adjust.33 
In sum, migration and settlement are multi-faceted phenomena that are best 
understood by examining economic changes in the sending country that induce people 
to leave; the opportunities in the destination region; and the linkages between the two 
areas through international production systems, informal networks developed by the 
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migrants themselves, and mediating mechanism such as the budding migration 
industry of lawyers, recruiters, traffickers, and the like.34 
The next question is why and how long people stay. The populist answer is that 
immigrants regard their host countries as the incarnation of heaven on earth and are 
hell bent on staying forever. Politicians who bring such a charge are clearly given to 
hyperbole in that they belittle the objective differences between heaven on the one 
hand, and Carinthia and Padania on the other.35 They are also curiously ignorant of 
what we know about the determinants of migrants’ relative return decisions. The 
section on immigration regimes below discusses this in some detail. 
 
Linkages between trade and migration 
 
The section on market access to the EU in the context of global trade liberalization 
described how EU protectionism prevents producers in poor countries from selling 
their goods on EU markets. Trade barriers obviously make it more likely that people 
move and they are one of the reasons behind migration decisions outlined in the 
section on why people move. Yet trade integration need not reduce the push factors 
behind migration. This is because of the simple truth that liberalization makes the 
world as a whole better off, but not every individual who lives in it. In the aggregate 
globalization is a positive-sum game. However it also produces losers. The real 
challenge is how to help the losers cope with their predicament. In other words trade 
liberalization and migration management are not alternative policy strategies. Unless 
this insight informs EU policy vis-à-vis developing countries, frictions between 
Europe and its neighbours and between policy goals and outcomes are bound to grow. 
 As an illustration take the EU’s relationship with its North African and Middle 
Eastern neighbours. On the whole the countries from Morocco to Egypt have 
abundant cheap labour. The EU, by contrast, is specialized in capital-intensive 
production. If the EU dropped its protectionism against farm and simple manufactured 
goods, Tunisian footwear producers and Moroccan vegetable growers would benefit 
and consequently have less incentive to move. In this case, exporting indeed 
substitutes for the decision to migrate, and there are only a few losers.36 
 But this is a highly simplified model. When made more realistic, it yields a 
completely different outcome. Let’s say Morocco uses its cheap labour in making 
textiles while the EU produces capital-intensive machinery. Theory tells us that if 
trade is liberalized, commodity prices converge. Machinery in Morocco and textiles in 
the EU become cheaper, and thanks to their export success workers in these two 
industries get higher wages. However, this also means that relative wages of farmers 
fall. Hence they have an incentive to migrate. So in this case there are more losers, 
and trade liberalization and migration become complements. 
 A similar outcome pertains if we compare vegetable cultivation in Morocco and in 
Andalusia. The Spanish growers employ better technology in this labour-intensive 
sector, such as larger plots, greenhouses and the like. If migration is restricted, 
Spanish wages are higher. If controls are relaxed, Moroccans move to Spain to take 
advantage of the higher wages, raising Spain’s labour/capital ratio – and, thus, 
specialization in horticultural production – leading to more exports. Thus an increase 
in migration leads to more, not less, trade which in turn may act as a pull factor on 
further inward migration because Moroccan farmers have a hard time competing 
against vegetable exports from Andalusia. 
 These models do not always produce clear predictions. Let’s say a Moroccan 
employee of a print shop has skills that in principle allow him to work in a footwear 
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factory, too. But the entrepreneur who owns the print shop cannot really move his 
equipment because it is specific to the task. If trade liberalization allows international 
publishing houses to compete in Morocco and consequently lowers the price of 
printed material, the worker will have to reduce his wage demands or risks getting 
laid off. Hence it will become more expensive for him to buy shoes. At the same, his 
newspapers get cheaper. At the end of the day, what happens to his real wage depends 
on how important newspapers are in his consumption basket, and whether he can find 
a job in another sector. 
 Moroccans are just across the sea from Spain and can literally get into a boat to try 
to make it into the EU. Extremely poor people in the world’s least developed 
countries, for example sugar cane farmers in Zambia or Mozambique, do not have 
that option. But if the EU abolished its subsidies on sugar exports and tariffs on sugar 
imports, the wages of those farmers would go up over time. Thus at least in principle, 
migration would become affordable. Again migration might then complement 
liberalization.37 
 What this discussion shows is that the dynamics of globalization simultaneously 
contain and promote the push and pull of migration. In theory we manage to specify 
the conditions under which more market access alleviates migratory pressure. In 
practice this is a messy affair and there is not enough knowledge about the exact 
empirical linkages between trade and migration across sectors and countries. In any 
event, it is important to underline that a more enlightened trade policy by itself is not 
going to do the trick of making migratory pressure or the demand for migrant labour 
disappear. Hence a world economy based on à-la-carte globalization that liberates all 
factor flows except labour is a fundamentally flawed concept. 
  
IMMIGRATION REGIMES IN THE EU 
 
EU policies on immigration are rather restrictive. This does not mean that all migrants 
are unwelcome. It means that compared to its own regime in the 1960s or compared to 
North American practices, the EU has been trying to keep migrants out, certainly 
those that are unskilled. Motives for this policy are to be found in two sets of 
arguments. The first charges that immigrants steal jobs from locals and are a burden 
on the welfare system. The second is rooted in notions of state sovereignty and 
national identity that in a direct sense have little or nothing to do with economic costs 
or benefits. Hence, this section treats economic and political justifications for 
restrictive immigration separately. Furthermore, it looks at the structure and delivery 
of immigration policy. Finally, it analyses the consequences. 
 
Labour market effects of immigration 
 
When the owner of a riding stable in Italy contracts a farm hand from Albania and 
pays him his market wage, the additional output increases, albeit only by little, the 
average incomes of Italian citizens.38 Hence, they are better off. Even though he 
makes less than his employer and the other stable owners, the immigrant is better off, 
too; indeed, this is the reason he migrated in the first place. The news of his success 
breaks back home and more willing labourers follow until each livery stable in Italy 
employs an immigrant from Albania. 
 After a couple of years the Italian government decides to grant the Albanians 
citizenship. (This hypothetical situation is so unrealistic that it requires considerable 
powers of imagination from the reader. Please try.) In principle this gives them the 
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right to buy land and set up their own stables. But since the new government policy 
took them completely by surprise, none of them have yet done so. 
 The good news again reaches the homeland and motivates more Albanians to seek 
positions as stable hands in livery stables which are doing a budding business. After a 
while each stable personnel consists of the owner (who may not muck out the boxes 
but does work full-time in the establishment), a naturalized citizen-labourer, and a 
new immigrant labourer. The newcomer is just as qualified for the job as his first 
arrived cousin (reportedly almost everybody in Albania is cousin of almost everybody 
else). But while the two may help each other with heavy tasks, they will also on 
occasion be in each other’s way so that the incremental output of the new immigrant 
is slightly lower than that of the first. This means that the new arrival’s market wage 
is lower, too. So the owner reduces his long-time employee’s wage as well because 
since the two cousins are doing the same job he can always hire a second new arrival 
to replace the first. The outcome is that the owner makes more profit, the new 
immigrant is happy, and the old immigrant is upset. 
 So he takes his savings and buys half the farm from the original owner with whom 
he splits the proceeds. The two owners pay themselves and the new immigrant the 
latter’s market wage. Now the former citizen-labourer is no longer worse off because 
he compensates his lower wage through earning profits from the operation of the 
stable. 
 The key difference between the two alternative endings of the story lies in who 
appropriates the return from capital. As the first ending shows, in the short to medium 
run, workers may lose out from additional immigration if they do not own productive 
assets. This ownership may be indirect, for example through pension funds. In the 
long run, what happens to native workers also depends on the effects of immigration 
on productivity, whether immigrants make demands on social security, and how much 
they pay in taxes. In essence, these are empirical questions. 
 There is no specific empirical evidence to support the link between immigration 
and labour market conditions of unskilled workers.39 This obviously defies 
everybody’s intuition, especially of the directly concerned. It is a shame therefore that 
governments in the EU do not make much use of these insights and bring them to the 
attention of the wider public. 
A study commissioned by the British government found that, far from being a 
burden on the public purse, immigrants have a net positive effect on prosperity and 
little or no effect on wages and job prospects of locals.40 This also goes for their 
contribution to sustaining pension systems in the context of ever aging populations 
(see Table 4).41 
Immigrants also create jobs. People who get off their butts in search for work 
halfway round the world are unlikely to be couch potatoes. Their youth and 
entrepreneurial dynamism is clearly above average and even perhaps more conducive 
to the EU’s lofty (and, judging by its performance to date, somewhat ridiculous) 
aspiration of becoming the world’s most competitive economy by 2010. When Rahma 
el Mouden arrived in the Netherlands in 1975, the girl from Morocco was 15. Some 
20 years later, with substantial experience as a cleaning woman, she started a 
company called MAS, Multicultural Amsterdam Cleaners. In 1999, she employed 75 
workers, mostly immigrants, and generated $1m sales. Foreigners in the EU earn at 
least $461bn a year and pay $153bn in taxes, roughly $60bn more than immigrants 
receive in welfare benefits.42 
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Table 4. – Share of population over 65 in total population 
 
1980 2000 2010 2030 2050
   
World 5.9 6.9 7.6 11.8 16.4
More developed 11.6 14.4 15.9 22.6 25.9
Less developed 4.1 5.1 5.8 9.9 15.0
Least developed 3.1 3.1 3.2 4.5 8.1
      
 
Source: ILO, World Employment Report 2001 (Geneva: ILO, 2001), Table 1.6. 
 
It does happen, of course, that immigrants bid down wages or take over a native’s 
job. Much textile parts manufacturing in the Italian town of Prato, a traditional textile 
centre, has been taken over by Chinese businesses. But if they had not come, there 
would be no native workers doing their jobs, either. Instead, productive capacities 
associated with a large part of the textile value chain would have closed for good 
because locals are unwilling to work at the low wages dictated by fierce international 
competition in this sector. Clearly, painful economic change regularly happens, but it 
is seldom migrants that drive this process. The demise of farming as a way of life, the 
disappearance of many heavy and engineering industries in the 1970s, or the IT 
meltdown in 2000 have nothing to do with immigration.  
 The point is that especially illegal immigrants – who of course pay no taxes and are 
ineligible for welfare benefits – mostly take up jobs that no one else is prepared to do. 
It is obviously easier for less competitive firms and sunset industries to get away with 
irregular employment and tax avoidance if they can rely on migrant labour. In the 
early 1990s, some 200,000 or so illegal immigrants lived in 38,000 dwellings just 
outside of Lisbon. They stayed in overcrowded shacks made from timber and 
corrugated iron and had to put up with awful sanitary conditions. Approximately 
15,000 of them were slave labourers sold by intermediaries to factories or 
construction companies in Lisbon, Northern Portugal, or the Algarve.43 It is 
preposterous to argue that Portuguese citizens would have any of this. Indigenous 
workers prefer situations of semi-employment or unemployment if confronted with 
what amounts to hard work for lousy pay. Short of completely dismantling Europe’s 
welfare system and fragmenting informal family support systems, this is not going to 
change. 
 The alternative to such abuses would be properly organized contract labour 
migration. But when such systems are politically inopportune to set up, governments 
may tacitly accept illegal movements to accommodate the need of employers for 
cheap workers without taking any political heat.44 It is fair to say that this makes them 
accomplices to abuse and, in the worst case, slavery. Native unskilled workers would 
best be protected by properly managed and regulated migration. So when 
governments cite the plight of the local poor as a justification for keeping migrants 
out officially while letting them in unofficially to keep unviable businesses afloat, 
they are being cynical. They certainly do not have a good economic reason for 
restricting immigration. 
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Hang-ups over sovereignty, national identity and “the others” 
 
The international norm for exit from countries is (or should be) freedom; that for entry 
is privilege. Control over which and how many foreigners get into a country is a 
traditional right of the nation state. States try to exercise this right by granting or 
denying access to individuals at their borders. Pre-globalization, when the idea that 
societies largely corresponded to economic systems was a lot easier to implement, 
states were responsible for cushioning the weak against the adverse effects of 
international competition that resulted from increasing openness. But states have been 
less and less able (and willing) to honour the redistributive social compact of the 
postwar era.45 This weakens their legitimacy. Successful immigration control, by 
contrast, could help strengthen legitimacy because it projects the image that states 
defend the entitlements of welfare and distributive justice against outsiders.46 The 
traditional perception is that a state unable to keep out undesirable elements is not 
worth its salt. But the current emphasis on “control” suggests that state sovereignty 
walks on short legs because illegal migration is on the rise and there is no indication 
of any let-up in this development. 
 In an attempt to strengthen their capacity at control, EU member states have 
instituted before-the-border regimes of immigration control. Thus borders no longer 
just refer to the physical installations that correspond to the demarcations drawn on 
political maps, but may mean a foreign airport, a refugee centre in a migration transit 
country, an embassy – in short, any space in which the state requires document 
checks, processes visa applications, or otherwise rejects demands for entry. From a 
control point of view, the advantage of this buffer zone is that at least in part it is not 
subject to domestic legal or international human rights norms that otherwise constrain 
the administrative effort of keeping out migrants deemed undesirable. The geographic 
extension of access control to European countries is a curious antidote to the EU’s 
recognition that a true single market implies borderless travel. If European integration 
cannot be realised unless a traveller from Madrid can disembark at Helsinki airport 
without having to produce an ID, how is a global economy supposed to function in 
which borderless travel for a majority of the world’s population is becoming less, not 
more, easy? 
 The focus on borders is thus problematic per se because it is fundamentally at odds 
with both the rhetoric and the practice of globalization. The notion of sovereignty on 
which it is based reflects the conception of a world that no longer exists. And the 
focus on individual migrants as the principal subject of the control effort is 
problematic because it ignores that migrants’ decisions to leave sending countries are 
largely matched by some sort of demand for their labour in the receiving countries.47 
 A majority of Europeans is concerned that immigrants (and other minorities) 
threaten social peace and welfare and exacerbate unemployment. Natives without 
higher education and with experience of unemployment have more critical views of 
immigrants and are more sceptical of multiculturalism.48 Not surprisingly, therefore, 
people less likely to have benefited from globalization are more hostile towards one 
of its more visible manifestations, namely people come from afar. What makes the 
latter different is, apart from their origin, what they look like, whom they worship, 
which social practices they honour, how affluent they are, and so on. Diffuse notions 
of national identity and cultural integrity become a defensive reflex that makes “the 
others” a scapegoat for social ills. 
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Table 5. – Global diversification of migration 
flows in select European countries 
(Total population by citizenship, 1 January 1998) 
 
 Belgium Germany Switzerland 
From/to: Number Per cent Number Per cent Number Per cent 
       
Total 10192264 100,0 82057379 100,0 7096465 100,0 
  Nationals 9289144 91,1 74691546 91,0 5721307 80,6 
  Non-nationals 903120 8,9 7365833 9,0 1375158 19,4 
       
Non-nationals not 
from EEA 
339863 3,3 5506417 6,7 554704 7,8 
of which       
       
EAST. EUROPE 14945 4,4 1999408 36,3 339716 61,2 
  Poland 6034 1,8 283312 5,1 4327 0,8 
  Ex-Yugo. 1309 0,4 1269606 23,1 316607 57,1 
       
OTHER EUROPE 82882 24,4 2109027 38,3 80574 14,5 
  Turkey 73818 21,7 2107426 38,3 80333 14,5 
       
AFRICA 171124 50,3 305595 5,5 31345 9,2 
  North 146364 43,1 143618 2,6 13208 2,4 
  West 3297 1,0 79469 1,4 5340 1,0 
  Horn .. .. 36494 0,7 3145 0,6 
  Sub-Saharan 14590 4,3 44157 0,8 9460 1,7 
       
AMERICA 22035 6,5 194371 3,5 42285 7,6 
  USA 12592 3,7 110105 2,0 12989 2,3 
       
ASIA 25677 7,5 781034 14,2 58336 10,5 
  Top-5 15280 4,5 384395 7,0 31764 5,7 
       
 
Source: Eurostat, European Social Statistics. Migration (Luxembourg: European Communities, 2000), 
Table B-2.1. 
 
Note: EEA (European Economic Area) = EU-15 + (EFTA – Switzerland). Top-5 Asian migrant source 
countries for Belgium = China, India, Japan, Philippines, Pakistan; for Germany = Afghanistan, Iran, 
Lebanon, Sri Lanka, Vietnam; for Switzerland = Sri Lanka, Vietnam, India, China, Philippines. 
 
Table 5 shows that the traditionally strongest immigrant communities – for 
example, Turks and North Africans in Belgium; Turks and citizens of the former 
Yugoslavia in Germany and Switzerland – still account for the majority of the non-
naturalised population that comes from outside the high-income part of Europe. But 
they are increasingly joined by others from much farther away. Thus, seven per cent 
of all Africans in Germany are from Ghana; Brazilians account for one per cent of the 
non-EEA foreign population in Switzerland – more than the Swiss in either Belgium 
or Germany; and there are growing communities of Chinese, Vietnamese, and Sri 
Lankans. In Italy, Morocco and Albania have replaced the US and Germany as the 
most important sending country (see Table 6). The more ethnically, racially, or 
culturally diverse the foreign population is, and the more the indigenous national 
identity is built upon ideas of ethnic or racial superiority and prejudices born out of 
ignorance, the more conflict potential exists that can be fomented, propagated, and 
instrumentalized.49 We know of course that migrants did not invent globalization, and 
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that globalization without migration – and, hence, more cultural diversity – is 
impossible. Yet the very concept of migration control neglects this insight. 
 
Table 6. – Stock of foreign population in Italy by nationality, in per cent 
 
 1985 1990 1995 1999
 
Morocco .6 10.0 9.5 11.9
Albania .0 .0 3.5 9.2
Philippines 1.8 4.4 4.4 4.9
Yugoslavia 3.3 3.8 5.7 4.4
Romania .0 1.0 2.5 4.1
United States 12.1 7.4 6.1 3.8
China .4 2.4 2.2 3.8
Tunisia 1.0 5.3 4.1 3.5
Senegal .1 3.2 2.4 3.0
Germany 8.8 5.3 4.0 2.8
Sri Lanka .6 1.5 2.0 2.4
Egypt 1.6 2.5 2.2 2.3
Poland .0 2.2 2.2 2.2
Peru .0 .7 1.0 2.1
India 1.2 1.4 1.5 2.0
Other 68.4 48.9 46.8 37.5
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Of which: EU .. 19.0 16.5 11.6
     
 
Source: OECD, Trends in International Migration (Paris: OECD, 2001), Table B.1.5. 
 
 Paradoxically, migration control also worsens the disproportionate incidence of 
crime among immigrants. Illegal immigrants are overrepresented among criminal 
immigrants and also among the population at large. Offences range from petty theft to 
very serious forms of organised crime. The rise in crime coincides with the 
beginnings of more restrictive immigration regimes from the mid-1970s. This 
obviously unintended consequence results from a selection bias in terms of which 
type of potential migrants is willing to challenge restrictive immigration regimes and 
accept illegal ways to enter destination countries.50 Drug runners from Kosovo and 
North Africa and pimps from Nigeria have fewer qualms about manoeuvring their 
way around immigration authorities to succeed in running their rackets on the streets 
of Milan and Turin than a tailor from Vietnam who hopes for a job in an Italian textile 
firm.51 Thugs clearly have a higher risk tolerance than law-abiding people, be they 
residents or migrants. 
 Crimes committed by some immigrants turn at least part of the resident population 
against all immigrants. The way governments deal with these fears tends to make 
matters worse. Those on the right follow their law-and-order reflexes and promise yet 
more migration control which in turn attracts more of the people societies can happily 
live without. Those on the left seldom confront the objective security problem head on 
for fear of raising the ugly spectre of xenophobia and racism. This is the wrong policy 
because it does not sufficiently differentiate between foreigners and criminals. The 
thugs prey on everyone regardless of status. Hence, resident aliens and illegal 
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immigrants are in need of protection, too. Also, as long as parts of the electorate feel 
unsafe walking the streets, multiculturalism will elude societies in favour of national 
homogeneity and thus make globalization much more difficult to manage. This is so 
much the more unfortunate as it threatens to waste promising social capital and 
goodwill – the majority of Europeans are actually optimistic about multiculturalism.52 
 
The “new” EU immigration policy 
 
Traditionally immigration policy has been the exclusive prerogative of the member 
states. This changed in 1999 when the Treaty of Amsterdam stipulated that the EU 
over a period of five years should assume responsibility over a range of issues, from 
internal movement of third-country nationals to common asylum procedures and a 
comprehensive system to combat illegal immigration. However, because of the real or 
imagined significance of immigration to state sovereignty, how many migrants each 
member state would accept and how long these people would be allowed to stay was 
to remain its own decision. In late 1999 the European Council mandated political 
guidelines to set up a so-called Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – a sort of EU 
equivalent to national justice and home affairs legislation, procedures, and practices. 
Under the new system immigration is both Community and national responsibility. 
Prior to the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam, third-country nationals working in 
one member state had in principle no right freely to travel to another. In practice, they 
still don’t. Freedom of movement inside the EU is thus a privilege accorded only to 
citizens. It is controversial whether this practice violates international human rights. 
But clearly the EU has not covered itself in glory in this respect.53 The current 
situation is as though an Algerian violinist working with the Boston Symphony 
Orchestra had to apply for a visa to visit the opera in New York or Chicago. The new 
treaty at least offers the perspective that this will change in the foreseeable future if 
the Commission manages to formulate harmonized policies and procedures and 
navigate them through the Council. The Commission’s draft directive for the 
admission of third country nationals proposes the establishment of a single residence 
and work permit.54 Overall, lifting immigration out of the non-justiciable twilight 
zone of ill-defined intergovernmental cooperation under the Maastricht Treaty and 
introducing a single constitutional base and more democratic control through the 
involvement of the European Parliament, is welcome per se. But it is of course the 
content of these emerging policies that matters most. 
 The Commission has tabled a number of proposals emphasizing that business-as-
usual is not an option in immigration policy. In its communication on a community 
immigration policy it acknowledged the economic reality of push and pull factors and 
argued that “the existing ‘zero’ immigration policies which have dominated thinking 
over the past 30 years are no longer appropriate.”55 The report also recognized that 
migrants generally have a positive effect on economic growth without burdening the 
welfare state or exacerbating unemployment. It implicitly admitted the perverse 
incentives restrictive policies contain. In Nigel Harris’s words, “[p]reventing people 
working so that they could not become citizens forced them to become citizens in 
order to work”.56 The Commission proposed that migrants be allowed to visit their 
home country without losing their status in the host country, and that all these rules 
apply to unskilled as well as skilled workers.57 In conclusion, lest it forget, it put the 
Council on notice that “a shift to a proactive immigration policy will require strong 
political leadership and a clear commitment to the promotion of pluralistic societies 
and a condemnation of racism and xenophobia.”58 
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But it may well happen that member states will have none of this and instead 
exploit the strengthened effectiveness of the new framework to justify policies that 
regard immigration as essentially a law-and-order problem and “securitize” its 
management.59 In the minds of national executives pondering the implications of a 
borderless Europe, immigration ranks right next to drug trafficking and organized 
crime, arguably a pretty weird assortment of apples and pears which suggests that 
policymakers have a rather limited understanding of the effects of their actions.60 
Even if the Commission’s relatively enlightened approach carries the day, the 
ultimate emphasis in immigration management remains on control. The idea is that 
we are happy to rescind some of the more knee-jerk attitudes toward immigrants, 
including those that are visibly different from us in that they are not white, because 
we realize that we benefit economically from their presence. Even in hard times we 
know that migrants are much more likely than citizens to set up a corner shop and 
employ the whole family to keep it open to business as long as our medieval 
regulations on opening hours allow. Settling for long-term unemployment is simply 
not their typical reaction. 
But we do not trust markets totally. If we did, we would acknowledge that people 
do not travel immense distances, shouldering very considerable costs and high risks, 
unless work prospects in the destination countries are reasonably realistic. Inward 
migration to Japan has been lower than to the US not just because the Japanese 
preferred to keep their society spanky homogeneous but because, if given the choice, 
only fools would opt to go to a country that has not grown for some ten years over one 
that has on balance done very nicely.61 So we insist on a system that allows us to filter 
those we deem worthy from those that we don’t. 
In trade, not trusting markets totally is the exception rather than the rule. A WTO 
member that declared a systematic preference for Made in Germany over Made in 
Taiwan would be treated like a bishop trying to convince the pope to retire the 
Almighty from the Holy Trinity. To be sure, protectionism is alive and well but the 
long-term trend since WWII has been one of progressive liberalization. When trade 
officials announce protectionist measures, they do not swagger into the press 
conference to brag about their achievements. They employ defensive, convoluted 
rhetoric because they know that what they are doing is not right. The same is true for 
capital and services. Some of this is schizophrenic but at least we acknowledge our 
shortcomings. 
No such recognition informs our thinking about immigration. There is a powerful 
residual of Us-and-Them sentiments that gives rise to idiotic fears of hordes of 
unskilled desperados going for the good life in Aalst, Peterborough, Hvidovre, or 
Pésaro. Nobody has calculated the total costs of trying to intercept the 500,000 illegal 
immigrants Europol estimates arrive in Europe every year. Control measures include 
actions in the source countries, the creation of buffer zones in Eastern Europe replete 
with funding to improve border surveillance, detention, police raids, penalties on 
employers, repatriation, and so on. They increasingly involve private actors – for 
example, airline carriers or security services – states use to extend migration control 
to deterrence-before-entry.62 In principle, any public policy should stand the test that 
benefits outweigh costs and that the intervention leads to the desired outcome. The 
first question is hard to answer because people evidently disagree about what 
constitutes a “benefit”. But we do know that immigration policy does not work – 
remember the clandestini from the beginning of the essay. 
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Consequences 
 
The number of clandestini is on the rise both because governments of destination 
countries try to restrict their legal entry, and because they are evidently unable to do 
so completely. Their lack of full control over illegal migration is no more surprising 
than their inability to rein in the drug or the arms trade. When demand and supply are 
outlawed, a black market emerges. This is not an argument in favour of the over-the-
counter availability of weapons-grade plutonium. It merely cautions that migration 
control is no longer merely about an individual wanting to get into a country and a 
government at destination granting or refusing access. Indeed, restrictive migration 
control leads to a budding migration industry which, in the words of a long-time 
observer, “may be more powerful in shaping population flows than the policies of 
states.”63 It also suggests that the criminal networks active in the migration industry 
must be included in any attempt to assess the relative costs and benefits of migration 
control. These networks are among the nastiest constituent elements of global crime, 
and dealing with the consequences of their presence does not come cheap. 
 Their business is human trafficking or, even more chilling, the body trade. It works 
like this.64 Tirunaukarasu Shadacharan runs a travel agency in Colombo, Sri Lanka. 
Kent Tours & Travels fronts for what really is a business that gets Sri Lankans to 
Western Europe, in 2000, for about $10,000. Mr Shadacharan first obtains travel 
documents for his clients who might be young Tamils from the war-torn Jaffna 
peninsula in the North. They go to Egypt by ship, holding a passport and a letter of 
appointment from an Egyptian cargo company both of which are fake. Upon arrival in 
Egypt they apply for a transit visa which is easily granted. While the migrants stay in 
Cairo safe houses, the traffickers prepare counterfeit documents for their onward 
journey by washing old visas, forging stamps, or using genuine visas from someone 
else’s passport. Then they fly to Amsterdam from where, in principle, they can reach 
other EU destinations. They might claim refugee status, go underground, and take 
menial jobs. If they were unable to finance the whole trip by themselves, they might 
end up indebted to the smugglers. 
 Not everybody needs upwards of $10,000 to make it to Western Europe. In 1999 
Albanian clandestini paid just $540 for the short ride by power boat across the 
Mediterranean. Middlemen in Tirana offered “package tours” – guaranteeing multiple 
crossings in case of failed landing attempts due to police interference – for $2,000. 
That year Italian authorities picked up 2,600 illegals a month on the stretch of coast 
facing Albania and reckoned that two to three times this number made it into Italy.65 
Bringing merely one hundred people across covers the price of a boat which shows 
how profitable this investment is for the traffickers. In Europe alone revenue from 
trafficking was estimated at $3-4billion in 1999.  
 According to UN estimates some four million people are trafficked each year. A 
quarter of these work or – more often – are exploited in sex industries. The fate of 
women and children who are trafficked for sex purposes is among the saddest realities 
of the global economy.66 Most of the prostitutes in Western Europe come from 
Eastern Europe and parts of the former Soviet Union, especially Russia and Ukraine. 
Many of these women are victims of the economic hardships that afflicted the 
transition economies and massively drove up inequality from Tallinn to Kiev. They 
lost their jobs due to necessary industrial restructuring. They also often lost their 
husbands, either literally or to alcohol, because many men were unable to cope with 
life in a market economy. 
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 As with other migrants, they need to earn a living somewhere; this is the push 
factor. Western Europe’s sex industry is worth some $9 billion; that is the pull 
factor.67 What brings supply and demand together and establishes an equilibrium of 
sorts are organized gangs of traffickers. Most of the women they recruit are lured with 
promises of decent jobs. In reality they are sold to pimps who practically own them 
because they hold their identity papers. Women who do not submit to their fate are 
controlled through violence or murdered. To add hypocrisy to tragedy, even in EU 
countries such as Germany and the Netherlands where prostitution is in principle 
legal, this only applies to EU citizens. This is bad news for the women from third 
countries because it enhances their dependence on the men who exploit them.68 This 
practice yet again underlines the predisposition of the EU to accord secondary status, 
lower protection, and less dignity to those it considers outsiders. 
 
Conclusion: How Europe fails the developing world 
  
Globalization has intensified the links between the world’s populations. The 
difference between the world economy and national economic systems is that the 
former is without the political institutions to (re)distribute the gains from integration 
and cushion against its costs. Migration is a response to this shortcoming – it 
“represents a claim to be included in systems for distributive justice.”69 
 The governments of the EU are unwilling to entertain this claim. On the contrary, 
they are responsible for an unjust distribution of the costs of and benefits from 
globalization that fuels the push and perhaps also the pull behind migration. EU farm 
and trade policies make life harder for people in developing countries. In migration 
control, the EU exploits its influence by externalising some of the dirty work while 
minimising its costs. In its attempt to keep migrants at bay, the EU’s use of its Central 
European neighbours as a buffer zone effectively shifts the major burden to the transit 
countries.70 This practice makes the rich EU a migration fortress and its poorer 
neighbours migration destinations of last resort. British Prime Minister Blair’s 
proposal to punish developing countries unless they manage to stem outmigration to 
the EU by withholding EU aid, is a telling example of rich-country hubris and a good 
illustration of making poor countries pick up the tab for the dislocations in rich 
countries caused by economic change. 
 Migration control is needed, some rightwingers argue, because the boat is full. 
They have a point in that there are obviously physical limits to how many people 
Europe can accommodate. It is also obvious that these limits will be exhausted in a 
densely populated country such as Holland long before they would be felt in Canada. 
If driving through the Scottish Highlands became just as much a nightmarish 
experience as being in London traffic during rush-hour; if visiting the cafés of 
Budapest implied a three-year waiting period; if the density of airline traffic darkened 
our skies; if siblings had to take turns going to school because average class sizes in 
elementary school had grown to 500 without any concomitant expansion in building 
facilities; if plumbers started fixing our teeth because dental practices were too busy 
issuing new appointments before summer 2007; and so on, the boat would indeed be 
full. No new passengers should be accepted lest it sinks. Needless to say, Europe is 
nowhere near this situation. 
 The upshots of liberalising immigration and the downside of restricting it are clear, 
certainly in economic and business terms. It is hardly a coincidence that the 
Economist, the Financial Times, and the Wall Street Journal are in support of free 
immigration and against racism. So why does it not happen? 
 21
 It does not happen because of the sorry moral and mental state of Europe’s political 
leaders. At issue is not so much the disgraceful rant by populists such as Kjærsgaard 
(People’s Party, Denmark), Haider (Freedom Party, Austria), Bossi (Northern League, 
Italy), Hagen (Progress Party, Norway) and Le Pen (National Front, France). 
Hopefully they are but a passing stage act in Europe’s political theatre of the absurd. 
The real culprits are smack in the political mainstream, both left and right. They are 
guilty of avoiding a rational debate on the relative merits of a more open immigration 
policy because keeping out migrants and asylum seekers, much like being tough on 
crime, is a vote getter. Much to our shame, racism is still socially acceptable in 
Europe. That makes foreigners, especially those that come from afar, easy scapegoats 
for all the problems our politicians do not have the guts to address. What they should 
do is go out and educate a largely uninformed electorate. Instead, they play fiddle to 
our xenophobic instincts. There is no excuse for this. 
 Of course, while political leaders bear the principal responsibility for the current 
state of affairs, European citizens have their share of hypocrisy. For example, many 
people will oppose official immigration for fear of increased competition in domestic 
labour markets. At the same time, they will happily condone illegal immigration 
because it provides them with the cheap builder from Eastern Europe who renovates 
their summer home for a fraction of what they would normally pay. 
 German or French tourists visiting the sights around Mazara del Vallo in Sicily 
might admire the temples in the nearby Greek settlement of Selinunte or the remnants 
of a Phenician trading outpost on the island of Mózia. In Pantelleria they would find 
dammusi, Arab-inspired architecture. Elsewhere they might come across traces of 
Jewish or Lebanese trading activity. In the past, migrants contributed to the creation 
of societies. The extraordinary vibrancy of classical and early medieval 
Mediterranean culture is a good illustration. It is short-sighted not to take inspiration 
from this for modern migration policy. 
Open markets require open minds. It is unrealistic to expect that everybody is 
prepared to live with the consequences. But those that don’t should not hold public 
office unless they are prepared to bite the bullet and go on record advocating 
nationalism, mercantilism, and a general retreat from globalization. A more open 
approach to immigration would help convince sceptical developing countries that they 
can reap some of the gains from globalization. If they continue to be sceptical, the 
emerging global environment of free markets and accountable governments is likely 
to suffer. 
 
 22
 
                                                 
Acknowledgements 
 
Zdenka Lomanova cheerfully provided very able research assistance. The 2002 
graduate class of the MScIB Programme at Copenhagen Business School animatedly 
debated a couple of provocations drawn from a very first draft of this text and 
encouraged me to let it loose on a wider audience. My colleague Steen Thomsen 
carefully read the text and provided helpful comments and constructive criticism. My 
parents and my brother put up with my (ultimately elusive) search for the captain of 
the Giove during a family Christmas outing to the port of Mazara del Vallo. My 
thanks go to all of them. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 Oxfam, Rigged Rules and Double Standards. (www.maketradefair.com, 2002). 
2 For an overview, see Paul Brenton, “The Changing Nature and Determinants of EU 
Trade Policies,” in Thomas L. Brewer, Paul A. Brenton, and Gavin Boyd, eds, 
Globalizing Europe, (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002), 205-41. 
3 UNCTAD, Least Developed Country Report 2002: Escaping the Poverty Trap, 
(Geneva: UN, 2002), Annex Table 3. 
4 WTO, “Market Access: Unfinished Business,” Special Studies no.6. (www.wto.org, 
2001). 
5 OECD, Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries, (Paris: OECD, 2002). 
6 CAFOD, “Dumping on the Poor” (www.cafod.org.uk, 2002), 7. 
7 Oxfam, “The Great EU Sugar Scam.” Briefing Paper no.27, (www.oxfam.org, 
2002). 
8 Paul Brenton, “The Changing Nature and Determinants of EU Trade Policies”; 
Hanaa Kheir-El-Din, “Implementing the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing,” in 
Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, and Philip English, eds, Development, Trade, and 
the World Trade Organization (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2002), 186-94. 
9 J. Michael Finger, “Safeguards,” in Bernard Hoekman, Aaditya Mattoo, and Philip 
English, eds, Development, Trade, and the World Trade Organization (Washington, 
DC: World Bank, 2002), 195-205. 
10 cf. Peter Stalker, Workers without Frontiers (London: Lynne Rienner, 2000). 
11 Gregory White, “Encouraging Unwanted Immigration: A Political Economy of 
Europe’s Efforts to Discourage North African Immigration,” Third World Quarterly 
20, no.4 (1999), 839-54. 
12 Stephen Castles, Ethnicity and Globalization (London: Sage, 2000), Chap.5. 
13 To be sure, this is a very high estimate. Many serious observers such as the UN 
Population Division speak of about half this figure. 
14 US (35m), Russia (13.3m), Germany (7.3m), Ukraine (6.9m), France (6.3m), India 
(6.2m), Canada (5.8), Saudia Arabia (5.2), Australia (5.5), Pakistan (4.2m), UK 
(4.0m), Kazakhstan (3.0m), Hong Kong (2.7), Ivory Coast (2.3), Iran (2.3m). See 
United Nations Population Division, World Population Monitoring 2002 (New York: 
UN, 2002). 
15 OECD, Trends in International Migration (Paris: OECD, 2001), 35. 
16 OECD, Trends in International Migration, 18. 
17 OECD, Trends in International Migration. 
 23
                                                                                                                                            
18 John Salt and James Clarke, “International Migration in the UNECE Region: 
Patterns, Trends, Policies,” International Social Science Journal 52, no.165 (2000), 
313-28. 
19 United Nations Population Division, World Population Monitoring 2000 (New 
York: UN, 2001). 
20 Saskia Sassen, Guests and Aliens (New York: New Press, 1999). 
21 A part of Mazara del Vallo’s old port district from which the Giove hailed is 
tellingly (and officially) named La Kasbah. 
22 Russel King, “Migration and Development in the Mediterranean Region,” 
Geography 81, no.1 (1996), 3-14. 
23 Dirk J. van de Kaa, ”International Mass Migration: A Threat to Europe’s Borders 
and Stability?” De Economist 144, no.2 (1996), 259-84. 
24 Migration News, Vol.9, no.12 (www.migration.ucdavis.edu/, 2002). 
25 Bimal Ghosh, “Towards a New International Regime for Orderly Movements of 
People,” in Bimal Ghosh, ed., Managing Migration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), 6-26. 
26 Saskia Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital: A Study in International 
Investment and Labor Flow (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Castles, 
Ethnicity and Globalization, Chaps 5, 8;  Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller, The 
Age of Migration, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 1998), Chap.7. 
27 cf. Benjamin Jones, “An Ecuadorian in Madrid,” Europe (November 2001), 11. 
28 cf. King, “Migration and Development in the Mediterranean Region.” 
29 See for example, Vincenzo Ruggiero, “Trafficking in Human Beings: Slaves in 
Contemporary Europe,” International Journal of the Sociology of Law 25 (1997), 
231-44. 
30 Sassen, The Mobility of Labor and Capital;  see also Castles and Miller, The Age of 
Migration, Chap. 7. 
31 Krystyna Iglicka, “Migration Movements from and into Poland in the Light of East-
West European Migration,” International Migration 39, no.1 (2001), 3-32. 
32 Ghosh, “Towards a New International Regime for Orderly Movements of People.” 
33 Sassen, Guests and Aliens, 137. 
34 Castles and Miller, The Age of Migration, Chap. 2. 
35 Carinthia and “Padania” are regional strongholds of two of Europe’s most 
xenophobic elected politicians, Jörg Haider from Austria and Umberto Bossi from 
Italy. 
36 cf. White, “Encouraging Unwanted Immigration.” 
37 For an in-depth treatment, see Riccardo Faini, Jaime de Melo, and Klaus F. 
Zimmermann, “Trade and Migration: An Introduction,” in Riccardo Faini, Jaime de 
Melo, and Klaus F. Zimmermann, eds, Migration: The Controversies and the 
Evidence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1-20. 
38 The idea of this section draws on a neat parable by Julian Simon, The Economic 
Consequences of Immigration, 2nd ed. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1999), Chap. 1. 
39 Faini, Melo, Zimmermann, “Trade and Migration.” 
40 Stephen Glover, Ceri Gott, Anaïs Loizillon, Jonathan Portes, Richard Price, Sarah 
Spencer, Vasanthi Srinivasan, and Carole Willis, “Migration: An Economic and 
Social Analysis,” RDS Occasional Paper no.67 (London: Home Office, 2001). 
 24
                                                                                                                                            
41 Jonathan Coppel, Jean-Christophe Dumont, and Ignazio Visco, “Trends in 
Immigration and Economic Consequences,” Economics Department Working Papers 
no.284 (Paris: OECD, 2001). 
42 William Echikson, “Unsung Heroes,” Business Week, 6 March (2000), 92-100. 
43 M. Eaton, “Foreign Residents and Illegal Immigrants in Portugal,” International 
Journal of Intercultural Relations 22, no.1 (1998), 49-66. 
44 Castles, Ethnicity and Globalization, Chap. 6. 
45 The points of tension between multiculturalism and social citizenship are often 
exaggerated. The post-war experience from OECD countries shows that ethno-
linguistic diversity and social redistribution may well be at odds. But how this 
relationship exactly played out varied from country to country because it was 
contingent on the structure of political institutions. In general, consociational 
democracies like Belgium and the Netherlands, with centralised institutions and a 
tradition of consensual decisionmaking, handled the friction better than liberal welfare 
states such as the UK with less extensive entitlement programmes. Social democratic 
and corporatist welfare states of the Scandinavian or continental European variety to 
this day appear to succeed to reconcile cultural diversity with more ambitious welfare 
programmes, albeit increasingly at the price of restrictive immigration and 
naturalization policies. Just to put things in perspective, a much more formidable 
challenge to inclusive social rights results from substate nationalisms like the Flemish, 
Catalans, or Basques. See Keith G. Banting, “Looking in Three Directions,” in 
Michael Bommes and Andrew Geddes, eds, Immigration and Welfare (London: 
Routledge, 2000), 13-33.  
46 Bill Jordan, and Franck Düvell, Irregular Migration (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2002), 
Chaps 1, 10. 
47 Saskia Sassen, “The De Facto Transnationalizing of Immigration Policy,” in 
Globalization and its Discontents (New York: New Press, 1998), Chap. 2. 
48 Eva Thalhammer, Vlasta Zucha, Edith Enzenhofer, Brigitte Salfinger, and Günther 
Ogris, “Attitudes towards Minority Groups in the European Union,” (Vienna: SORA, 
2001). 
49 cf. Helga Leitner, “International Migration and the Politics of Admission and 
Exclusion in Postwar Europe,” Political Geography 14, no.3 (1995), 259-78; Jim Mac 
Laughlin, “Racism, Ethnicity and Multiculturalism in Contemporary Europe: A 
Review Essay,” Political Geography 17 no.8 (1998), 1013-24; Thomas F. Pettigrew, 
“Reactions towards the New Minorities of Western Europe,” Annual Review of 
Sociology 24 (1998), 77-103. 
50 Virginie Guiraudon, and Christian Joppke, 2001. Controlling a New Migration 
World. In Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke, eds, Controlling a New 
Migration World (London: Routledge, 2001), 1-27. 
51 Marzio Barbagli, Immigrazione e criminalità in Italia (Bologna: Mulino, 1998). 
52 Thalhammer et al., “Attitudes towards Minority Groups in the European Union.” 
For a discussion of the situation in the US, see Peter H. Schuck, “Immigration at the 
Turn of the New Century,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 33, 
no.1 (2001), 1-11. 
53 Jacqueline Bhabha, “’Get Back to Where You Once Belonged’: Identity, 
Citizenship, and Exclusion in Europe,” Human Rights Quarterly 20, no.3 (1998), 592-
627; Theodora Kostakopoulou, “The ‘Protective Union’: Change and Continuity in 
Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe,” Journal of Common Market 
 25
                                                                                                                                            
Studies 38, no.3 (2000), 497-518; Ian Ward, “Law and the Other Europeans,” Journal 
of Common Market Studies 35, no.1 (1997), 79-96. 
54 Commission of the European Communities,  “Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community 
Immigration Policy,” COM(2000) 757 final. 
55 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community 
Immigration Policy”, 6. 
56 Nigel Harris, Thinking the Unthinkable: The Immigration Myth Exposed (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 2002), 31. 
57 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community 
Immigration Policy”, 8, 17. 
58 Commission of the European Communities, “Communication from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on a Community 
Immigration Policy”, 22. 
59 Virginie Guiraudon, “European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-
making as Venue Shopping,” Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no.2 (2000), 
251-71; Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” 
Journal of Common Market Studies 38, no.5 (2000), 751-7. 
60 cf. Kostakopoulou, “The ‘Protective Union’.” 
61 cf. Harris, Thinking the Unthinkable, Chap. 2. 
62 Gallya Lahav, “Immigration and the State: the Devolution and Privatisation of 
Immigration Control in the EU,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 24 no.4 
(1998), 675-94. 
63 Castles, Ethnicity and Globalization, 126; cf. John Salt, and Jeremy Stein, 
“Migration as a Business: The Case of Trafficking,” International Migration 35, no.4 
(1997), 467-94; John Salt, “Trafficking and Human Smuggling: A European 
Perspective,” International Migration 38, no.1 (2000), 31-56. 
64 The following account is based on a real example described by Charu Lata Joshi, 
“The Body Trade,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 October (2000), 100-103. 
65 “Europe’s Borders: A Single Market in Crime,” Economist, 16 October (1999), 23-
28. 
66 cf. Donna M. Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade: The Transnational Shadow Market of 
Trafficking in Women,” Journal of International Affairs 53, no.2 (2000). 625-51. 
67 “In the Shadows,” Economist, 26 August (2000), 38-9. 
68 cf. Hughes, “The ‘Natasha’ Trade.” 
69 Jordan and Düvell, Irregular Migration, 243. 
70 cf. Marek Okólski, “Recent Trends and Major Issues in International Migration: 
Central and East European Perspectives,” International Social Science Journal 52, 
no.165 (2000), 329-41. 
 26
